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1. Introduction
In a thoughtful critique of various proposals to
change the current financial reporting of intangi-
bles and their consequences, Douglas Skinner con-
cludes ‘… the case for reform is surprisingly
weak, … capital markets actually function rather
well, … an approach to intangibles that involves
mandating more extensive disclosure in this area is
likely to be unsuccessful, … there are market-
based incentives for companies to voluntarily pro-
vide this disclosure, … proposals to modify the
current accounting model … are flawed …’. The
following brief comments make it clear why I take
exception to these conclusions, and yet I commend
Skinner for urging researchers and policymakers
to base their recommendations on solid research.
2. Market incentives: déjà vu all over
again
A major theme of Skinner’s rejection of the vari-
ous proposals for change is that ‘… we need to
rely on private incentives to encourage disclosure
of information related to the management and val-
uation of intangibles…’. Similarly, ‘Moreover, to
the extent that investors find such disclosures use-
ful, market forces will provide managers with in-
centives to disclose them …’, and ‘… to the extent
that disclosures have net benefits firms themselves
have incentives to voluntarily provide such disclo-
sures …’, indicate the drift of the argument.
Such an unequivocal faith in market forces to
elicit information is for me a case of déjà vu. In an
influential paper at the time, the leading finance
scholar Steve Ross (1979: 193) invoked the very
same argument to reject the need for any disclo-
sure regulation:
‘… the new structure [incentive-signaling
model] basically supports the view that there are
strong market forces tending to lead to adequate
disclosure in absence of disclosure legislation, a
view in sharp contrast to the traditional view that
disclosure regulation is required because insid-
ers have strong incentives to withhold informa-
tion (emphasis mine).’1
Skinner thus applies Ross’ argument to the in-
tangibles area. My question is: Why stop with in-
tangibles? If market incentives for corporate
disclosure are so effective, why require firms to
disclose a cash flow statement, segment reporting,
or fair values? Obviously, invoking market incen-
tives to flatly reject disclosure proposals, without a
careful consideration of market imperfections and
managers’ incentives, is a slippery slope.
3. Harms of current GAAP concerning 
intangibles
Skinner summarises his criticism of the various
empirical studies suggesting that the current ac-
counting for intangibles is harmful by: ‘There is no
evidence that the accounting or disclosure treat-
ment of intangibles in and of itself results in sys-
tematically lower valuations for these firms.’ This
sweeping conclusion is not supported by Skinner’s
arguments. For brevity, I will comment on two re-
search findings which Skinner criticises.
Boone and Raman (2001) document that re-
search and development (R&D)-intensive firms
have relatively high bid-ask spreads, and low
depth, which in turn lead to excessive cost of cap-
ital. Skinner’s criticism: ‘… these results simply
reflect the fact that investors, as we would expect,
believe that expenditures on intangibles are riskier
than other investments.’ Reading this, one would
think that Boone and Raman did not control for
risk in examining the relation between R&D and
stocks’ bid-ask spread and depth. Not so. They in-
deed do control for multiple risk factors, such as
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return volatility, size, earnings volatility, beta, etc.
Consequently more than just invoking a risk argu-
ment is required to reject Boone and Raman’s find-
ings.
Skinner then rejects several studies documenting
undervaluation (and by implication – excessive
cost of capital) of R&D-intensive firms, but ig-
nores the most comprehensive and convincing
study – Eberhart et al. (2004). These researchers
document, based on comprehensive research using
state-of-the-art risk-adjustment and long-term re-
turn cumulation methodologies, that firms which
increased their R&D expenditures exhibit long-
term abnormal positive returns, which leads the re-
searchers, after rejecting various alternative
explanations, to conclude: ‘Our results provide
strong evidence that investors systematically un-
derreact to the benefit of an R&D increase.’
Skinner’s reaction to the R&D undervaluation
studies is: ‘… studies that cumulate measured ab-
normal returns after an event date are notoriously
difficult to interpret given vagaries in the measure-
ment of expected returns …’. I find this criticism,
which can be levelled at practically any market-
based accounting or finance research, overly
sweeping and lacking in specificity. Eberhart et al.
(2004), as well as Lev et al. (2007), use state-of-
the-art risk adjustment research methodologies,
and to just state that ‘… R&D projects are inher-
ently riskier …’ dismisses too easily important
findings about harms (systematic undervaluations)
apparently caused by current accounting.
Ironically, Skinner finds fault with the evidence
which ‘… is largely limited to firms with high lev-
els of R&D expenditures’. But note that the lack of
evidence on brands, information technology, and
other major intangibles is due to the very thing he
rejects – proposals to expand the disclosure about
intangibles.
4. A different view of R&D and advertising
growth
Skinner’s Figure 1 – R&D and advertising growth
– leads him to conclude that ‘Aggregate R&D
spending increases steadily over this period, and is
250% higher in 2005 than it was in 1980. This is
striking evidence … that its accounting treatment
has not obviously adversely affected its growth’.
Skinner’s Figure 1 portrays aggregate expendi-
tures of Compustat firms on capital expenditures,
R&D, and advertising during 1980–2005, adjusted
for inflation. But US inflation during most of that
period was subdued and fell (fortunately) far short
of business growth. I, therefore, believe that to as-
certain whether business investment in R&D and
advertising was adequate, it is more appropriate to
consider R&D and advertising growth relative to
business growth. This is, of course, the basis for
the widely-used, by both researchers and practi-
tioners, measures of R&D and advertising intensi-
ties – the variables scaled by sales.
In Figure 1, I present, for Compustat firms, R&D
and advertising intensities (scaled by sales) during
the 20-year period 1987–2006. I use the ratio of
total R&D to total sales.
Evidently, the ‘striking’ growth all but disap-
pears. R&D intensity increased over the entire 20-
year period by 17.5% (less than 1% per year), and
advertising intensity decreased by 22.5%. Relative
to the scale of operations, US companies have not
substantially increased investment in R&D and ad-
vertising. And this, during a period when intangi-
bles became the prime value-drivers of businesses,
and as US firms are increasingly challenged by
high R&D-spending China. Whether this is related
to accounting for intangibles or not is, of course,
hard to prove.
5. What’s to be done?
Let me turn from criticising the critic to what, in
my opinion, should be done to improve the report-
ing of intangibles. Two things: capitalisation of
certain investments in intangibles, and facilitation
of improved standardised disclosures about intan-
gibles.
The CEOs of the major accounting firms recent-
ly called for changing the accounting for intangi-
bles, in part because, ‘The large discrepancies
between the ‘book’ and ‘market’ values … provide
strong evidence of the limited usefulness of state-
ments of assets and liabilities …’ (DiPiazza, et al.,
2006). Skinner rejects such an argument for
change based on book-market discrepancy be-
cause, ‘… the balance sheet is not designed to
form the basis for valuation. Rather, most ap-
proaches to equity valuation rely on information
from the income statement, …’.
This rejection of the balance sheet’s relevance
will come to the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), among others, as a great surprise.
The FASB clearly prefers the balance sheet ap-
proach over the income statement in standard set-
ting (see FASB Concepts Statements on the
preference of the asset/liability approach over the
matching approach).
More importantly, I frankly never understood
the separate balance sheet vs. income statement ar-
guments. Is it not the case that things affecting the
balance sheet also have an impact on the income
statement? Is it not the case that the expensing of
R&D understates the asset values and the earnings
of R&D-growth companies? Accordingly. I sup-
port the CEOs of the major accounting firms, con-
cerned that when firms’ book values are, on
average, a quarter or less than market values,
something is basically wrong with financial re-
ports. Is capitalising intangibles with reasonable
reliable benefits the solution?
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Well, the limited evidence we have provides an
affirmative answer. Limited evidence, because ex-
cept for software capitalisation and that of ac-
quired intangibles, US firms do not capitalise
intangibles. So, there are no data to test. But the
evidence on capitalised software development
costs (Aboody and Lev, 1998) clearly indicates:
(1) the capitalised software is considered an asset
by investors, and (2) earnings based on software
capitalisation better predict future earnings than
full-expensing earnings.2 Furthermore, Oswald
and Zarowin (2007), examining UK companies
which capitalise R&D, document that R&D capi-
talisation leads to a higher association between
current stock returns and future earnings (namely,
investors are better informed by R&D capitalisa-
tion), and Kimbrough (2007a), studying R&D 
capitalisation by target companies, concludes 
(p. 1195):
‘The evidence is consistent with the notion that
both financial statement recognition and ana-
lysts’ private information search activities lead
to the revelation of private information about the
value of R&D assets that investors incorporate
into equity values.’
Regarding the capitalisation of acquired intangi-
bles, Kimbrough (2007b) documents that investors
find the values of recognised intangibles informa-
tive.
Admittedly somewhat limited, the evidence,
only some of it quoted above, nevertheless indi-
cates that capitalising intangibles with reasonably
reliable benefits (e.g. R&D, particularly of multi-
projects, brand enhancement, or information tech-
nology) will be beneficial to financial statement
users. I am not familiar with evidence to the con-
trary. An important point: R&D capitalisation
doesn’t mean a simple aggregation of past expen-
ditures, as many believe. Rather, as in software de-
velopment costs (SFAS 86), capitalisation
commences when the project passes successfully a
technological feasibility test. Capitalisation thus
conveys important inside information – success of
the development programme – to investors.
The second improvement in financial reporting I
envisage is a standardised disclosure template
about investments in intangibles (currently, only
R&D expenditures are separately reported) and
their consequences. Considerable evidence indi-
cates that disclosure about intangibles, not neces-
sarily their value, is highly relevant to investors.
For example, the extent of information about prod-
uct development stage at IPOs of biotech compa-
nies is negatively associated with stock volatility
and bid-ask spreads (Guo et al., 2004); intensity of
royalty income from licensing patents is positively
associated with the market valuation of R&D 
expenditures (Gu and Lev, 2004); disclosure of 
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 211
Figure 1
R&D and advertising intensities, 1987–2006
2 These findings were corroborated and extended by Mohd
(2005).
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innovative activities by high tech firms is value-
relevant to investors (Gu and Li, 2003; Gu and Li,
2007); investors react to the granting of patents
(Austin, 1993), and the quality of the scientific
workforce is positively related to market values
(Darby et al., 1999). This is only a partial list of
evidence.
This evidence clearly indicates that information
about investments in intangibles and their conse-
quences (patents granted and licensed, product de-
velopment stage, etc.) is highly relevant to
investors. However, such information is haphaz-
ardly disclosed, not unlike segment information
before its standardised disclosure was mandated. It
would, therefore, be highly beneficial if an author-
itative body, such as the FASB or the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), will develop
templates for disclosure about intangibles, leading
to the dissemination of standardised and compara-
ble information about these all-important assets. I
provide such a general template in Lev (2001), and
the SEC Commission (Garten, 2001), strongly en-
dorsed this idea.
Skinner, however, claims that such proposals
will not work because: ‘First, many of the meas-
ures would be industry or firm specific, and so not
subject to standardisation or comparison. Second,
… many of these measures will be difficult to ver-
ify in an objective way …’. Not so. True, some the
disclosures will be applicable to broad industry
groups (R&D and patents to all high tech and sci-
ence-based sectors, for example) – though defi-
nitely not firm-specific – but note that much of
current GAAP is industry-specific: insurance and
securities companies accounting; regulated enter-
prises; movies, music and cable accounting; for
example. Such information is obviously standard-
ised within broad industry groups. Moreover, there
is nothing new in my proposal for establishing dis-
closure norms about intangibles. SFAS 161 (deriv-
atives), for example, is in part, a codification of
measurements and risk assessments practised by
some firms, and turned by SFAS 161 to a stan-
dardised disclosure.
As to Skinner’s issue with the objective verifica-
tion of the proposed data, many of the proposed
measures, such as investment in employee training
or information technology, product development
stage, or percentage of sales from recently intro-
duced products (an important innovation indica-
tor) are factual, and easily subject to auditor
verification.
6. Postscript
Toward the end of his paper Skinner writes ‘… it
is difficult to see how accounting rules could be
modified … without changing the overall account-
ing model in important ways.’ So what, if the ac-
counting model has to be changed? Isn’t the
accounting system that just over the last ten years
failed to give an inkling about the late 1990s huge
bubble in tech stocks, failed to alert investors to
the massive accounting scandals of the early
2000s, and fails again now to reflect appropriately
the vanishing values of sub-prime mortgages, due
for a major overhaul? After all, isn’t the declared
purpose of accounting information to ‘… provide
information to help present and potential investors
and creditors and others in assessing the amounts,
timing, and uncertainty of prospective cash re-
ceipts…’ (FASB, Concept No. 1, p. 686)? Why can
the system of national accountants be substantially
overhauled with respect to intangibles – capitalis-
ing software expenditures for several years now
and currently considering the capitalisation of
R&D and other intangibles – but the corporate ac-
counting system cannot change?
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